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¶1 The release of the video game Spore by Electronic Arts highlighted 
the controversy surrounding software-based digital rights management 
(“DRM”) systems.
 
ABSTRACT 
Despite using one of the most sophisticated digital rights 
management systems currently available, the video game Spore 
was illegally downloaded approximately 1.7 million times between 
September and December of 2008, making it the most widely 
pirated game of 2008 by more than half a million downloads.  This 
iBrief addresses several legal arguments that have been raised 
against a digital rights management system called “SecuROM,” 
which is widely used by video game companies like Electronic Arts, 
the publisher of Spore.  First, the iBrief discusses the comparisons 
that have been drawn between SecuROM and the controversial 
digital rights management technologies previously employed by 
Sony BMG Music Entertainment.  Second, the iBrief addresses the 
question of whether highly restrictive implementations of SecuROM 
may be legally circumvented under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.  Third, the iBrief discusses the potential for using 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s three-year rulemaking 
procedure to obtain certain exemptions for circumventing systems 
like SecuROM. 
INTRODUCTION 
2  Software-based DRM systems function as a kind of 
digital fence to protect the intellectual property rights of copyright owners 
after their products have been sold to the public.  Electronic Arts employed 
a DRM system in Spore that, among other things, requires users to 
authenticate the product in order to ensure it is a legitimate copy.3
                                                     
1 J.D. candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2010; B.A. in Philosophy, 
Wheaton College, 2006.  Thanks to Professor Jennifer Jenkins for her invaluable 
assistance.  Any errors are the author’s alone. 
  The 
inclusion of this DRM system sparked an intense public debate.  Consumer 
2 Andy Greenberg & Mary Jane Irwin, Spore’s Piracy Problem, FORBES, Sept. 
12, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/technology/2008/09/12/spore-drm-piracy-tech-
security-cx_ag_mji_0912spore.html. 
3 Id. 
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rights advocates argued that Spore and its DRM scheme infringe on the 
rights of legitimate consumers to use their lawfully purchased goods.4  On 
the other side of the debate, copyright owners like Electronic Arts claimed 
that DRM systems are necessary to prevent infringement of their intellectual 
property rights, and that the vast majority of legitimate users are completely 
unaffected by DRM.5
¶2 Early software DRM systems were both low-tech and relatively 
easy to bypass.  For example, the original Warcraft game released by 
Blizzard Entertainment in 1994 required the user to type a word from the 
game manual during installation
 
6—a measure that could be easily defeated 
by merely obtaining a scan or photocopy of the manual.  Another popular 
DRM scheme required the user to input a unique CD Key, a series of 
characters printed somewhere on the software packaging, to authenticate the 
product during installation.7  This proved ineffective, because many 
websites offered “key generators,” which generate a series of characters that 
the software accepts as a legitimate CD Key.8
¶3 Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, software publishers 
have taken advantage of more advanced hardware- and software-based 
 
                                                     
4 Id. 
5 David Kaplan, Electronic Arts’ Riccitiello: Last Year for “Offline-Only” 
Games, PAIDCONTENT.ORG, Oct. 14, 2008, 
http://www.paidcontent.org/entry/419-media-money-eas-riccitiello-last-year-for-
offline-only-games.  In discussing Electronic Arts’ decision to modify the DRM 
system that it used for Spore after it received many consumer complaints, the 
company’s CEO, John Riccitiello, stated that DRM is “something that 99.8 
percent of users wouldn't notice.  But for the other .2 percent, it became an issue 
and a number of them launched a cabal online to protest against it.  I personally 
don't like DRM. It interrupts the user experience.  We would like to get around 
that. But there is this problem called piracy out there.”  Id. 
6 See Blizzard Support - Warcraft Installation Passwords, 
http://us.blizzard.com/support/article.xml?articleId=20912&categoryId=2611&p
arentCategoryId=&pageNumber=1 (last visited June 12, 2009) (listing the 
installation passwords for users who wish to install Warcraft but no longer have 
access to the original game manual). 
7 See, e.g., Retail CD Keys, 
https://support.steampowered.com/kb_article.php?ref=7480-wusf-3601 (last 
visited June 12, 2009) (“The CD Key is a serial number with a combination of . . 
. letters and numbers - it can be found on a sticker inside your game's case or 
printed on the game's quick reference card.”). 
8 See Tim Fisher, CD Key Generator - Will a Product Key Generator Find My 
CD Key?, ABOUT.COM, 
http://pcsupport.about.com/od/productkeysactivation/f/cdkeygenerator.htm (last 
visited June 12, 2009). 
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technological protection measures, such as SecuROM,9 SafeDisc,10 and 
StarForce.11  These systems typically provide copyright owners with 
stronger anti-copying protections.  For example, some implementations of 
SecuROM install a small program that checks to see whether a legitimate 
copy of the software disc is in the computer every time the user attempts to 
run the protected program.12  Although this gives copyright owners greater 
control in preventing illegal uses of their intellectual property, critics have 
argued that these technological protection measures place an unreasonable 
burden on consumers by creating security risks for their computers and 
potentially preventing them from installing the software that they have 
purchased.13  Finally, even these technologically advanced methods of 
copyright protection are still not immune to circumvention.  Despite its 
SecuROM protection, Spore was downloaded approximately 1.7 million 
times between September and December of 2008, making it the most 
heavily pirated game of 2008 by more than half a million downloads.14
¶4 SecuROM, the DRM system used in Spore, is the source of the 
most recent legal debate about software-based DRM.  The two particular 
legal issues that this iBrief will address are (1) whether SecuROM is 
substantially similar to the rootkit software that the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) essentially prohibited in 2007 and (2) whether a 
product that circumvents SecuROM’s technological protection measures 
could be legal under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).  
Section I of this iBrief outlines the technical details of SecuROM and 
frames the current legal controversy surrounding the product.  Section II 
discusses the significant distinctions between SecuROM and the rootkit 
software condemned by the FTC in 2007.  Section III evaluates SecuROM 
in light of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions, arguing (1) that 
certain methods of circumventing SecuROM might not violate the DMCA’s 
anti-circumvention provisions and (2) that an entity seeking an exemption 
 
                                                     
9 SecuROM Frequently Asked Questions at 1.1–1.2, 
http://www.securom.com/support_faq.asp [hereinafter SecuROM FAQ] (last 
visited June 12, 2009). 
10 Lisa Vaas, Windows Users Getting Bitten by Macrovision Zero Day, 
EWEEK.COM, Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Windows-
Users-Getting-Bitten-by-Macrovision-Zero-Day; see also Microsoft Security 
Advisory, Nov. 5, 2007, 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/944653.mspx. 
11 Nate Anderson, It's Official: Ubisoft Dumps StarForce, ARS TECHNICA, Apr. 
14, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2006/04/6603.ars. 
12 See, e.g., SecuROM FAQ, supra note 9, at 4.4. 
13 See Greenberg, supra note 2; see also infra notes 32–36, 141–43 and 
accompanying text. 
14 Spore at Top of Piracy Charts, BBC NEWS, Dec. 10, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7772962.stm. 
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authorizing it to bypass the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions would 
almost definitely fail to meet the high evidentiary burden. 
I. WHAT IS SECUROM? 
A. How SecuROM Works 
¶5 SecuROM is a highly customizable DRM system developed and 
sold by Sony DADC.15  SecuROM operates using two different 
components: a hardware component and a software component.  The 
hardware component prevents direct copying of a disc.  The software 
component first requires a user to activate her license in order to install the 
protected software, and then encrypts the program once it has been installed 
on the user’s computer to prevent further copying.16
¶6 When the user inserts a SecuROM-branded disc into her computer, 
the SecuROM software is installed contemporaneously with the main 
program on the disc.
 
17  A copyright owner typically requires a user to 
activate her license during this installation, unless the copyright owner has 
chosen to use only the disc-based activation features of SecuROM.18  The 
copyright owner can also configure SecuROM to require this online 
activation only during the initial installation, after a specific number of 
launches, or after a pre-determined period of time.19  The number of 
simultaneously activated copies of the software that a user may have at any 
given time is entirely at the discretion of the copyright owner.20  For 
example, Spore permits the user to activate the game up to five times, and 
these activations can be “revoked” and later re-used by running a special 
program available directly from Electronic Arts.21  Another Electronic Arts 
product, the game Mass Effect, only allows users to install the game three 
times, and these activations cannot be “revoked.”22  According to 
SecuROM, this feature is highly customizable, with a company conceivably 
able to limit users to a single, non-revocable activation.23
                                                     
15 SecuROM FAQ, supra note 9, at 1.1–1.2.  
16 Id. at 1.2. 
17 Id. at 2.2. 
18 Id. at 1.2. 
19 Id. at 4.4. 
20 Id. 
 
21 Spore De-Authorization Tool, http://www.spore.com/patch/deauthorization 
(last visited June 12, 2009). 
22 Official BioWare/Electronic Arts Response to DRM Discussion, May 9, 2008, 
http://masseffect.bioware.com/forums/viewtopic.html?topic=629059&forum=12
5 [hereinafter BioWare/Electronic Arts Response]. 
23 See SecuROM FAQ, supra note 9, at 4.4. 
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¶7 SecuROM’s software component has two other important features.  
First, it can determine whether there have been any hardware changes to the 
user’s computer since the last time the user ran the protected program.24  
Again, the extent to which this feature limits the user is at the discretion of 
the company employing SecuROM.25  One company might allow a user to 
make significant hardware changes without requiring re-activation, whereas 
another company might require a user to re-activate her software after 
performing a single, relatively minor change, like upgrading her computer’s 
graphics card.26  Second, SecuROM can detect whether the user has any 
emulation software running on her computer, which might enable the user 
to run a modified version of the protected software that bypasses the 
activation or authentication requirements.27
B. Controversy and Legal Action 
  Thus, SecuROM is capable of 
placing significant limitations on the way in which consumers are able to 
use their SecuROM-protected products. 
¶8 Electronic Arts initially planned to permit only three installations of 
Spore.28  This plan was met with significant consumer backlash, causing 
Electronic Arts to modify the activation limit of SecuROM to permit five 
installations.29  The company also developed a software tool that allows 
users to revoke their activations.30  Finally, Electronic Arts has repeatedly 
stated that if users have reached the activation limit and legitimately need 
additional activations, they can call the company’s technical support hotline 
and the company will grant additional activations on a case-by-case basis.31
                                                     
24 Id. at 4.3. 
25 Id. 
26 Id.  The SecuROM FAQ states that “SecuROM can be configured by the 
publisher to be more lenient or more strict with regards to changes to the system 
configuration.  This means that publishers can configure the tolerance threshold 
at their own discretion, so there might be applications which do not tolerate a 
single change and there might be other applications which tolerate many major 
changes.”  Id. 
27 Id. at 2.9. 
  
Despite these concessions, on September 22, 2008, an owner of a copy of 
Spore filed a class action lawsuit against Electronic Arts in the United 
28 Electronic Arts Responds To DRM Complaints, KOTAKU, Sept. 19, 2008, 
http://kotaku.com/5052473/ea-respond-to-drm-complaints [hereinafter 
Electronic Arts Response]. 
29 Id. 
30 Id.; Spore De-Authorization Tool, supra note 21. 
31 See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
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States District Court for the Northern District of California.32  The plaintiff 
alleges that Electronic Arts violated California’s consumer protection 
statute, unfair competition law, and the common law prohibition against 
trespass to chattels.33  The law firm representing the plaintiffs in the Spore 
case also represents plaintiffs in two similar lawsuits against Electronic Arts 
concerning two other SecuROM-protected video games.34  At least two 
other similar complaints have been  filed against Electronic Arts.35  One 
important aspect of these lawsuits is that the plaintiffs allege that their 
computers were actually damaged by the SecuROM software,36
II. SECUROM AND THE SONY BMG FTC ORDER 
A. Sony BMG’s DRM and the FTC 
 although it 
is still unclear whether there is any evidence to support their claims.  In the 
following two sections, this iBrief will address the legal issues related to (1) 
the FTC’s order in the Sony BMG Music Entertainment (“Sony BMG”) 
rootkit case, and (2) SecuROM as it relates to the DMCA’s anti-
circumvention provisions. 
¶9 In 2005, a security researcher discovered that Sony BMG’s 
Extended Copy Protection (“XCP”) DRM system, which it used on many of 
its music CDs, installed a program called a rootkit when users inserted these 
                                                     
32 Complaint, Thomas v. Electronic Arts, Inc., Case No. 5:08-cv-04421-PVT 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2008/09/23/Spore.pdf. 
33 Id. at ¶¶ 51, 59, 73. 
34 Complaint, Eldridge v. Electronic Arts, Inc., Case No. 3:08-cv-04733-BZ 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2008) (class action lawsuit based on the use of SecuROM in 
Spore Creature Creator), available at 
http://media.libsyn.com/media/gamepolitics/EA-spore-eldridge-vs-ea.pdf; 
Complaint, Gardner v. Electronic Arts, Inc., Case No. 5:08-cv-04629-RS (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 6, 2008) (class action lawsuit based on the use of SecuROM in Mass 
Effect), available at 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2008/10/08/MassEffect.pdf. 
35 Complaint, McQuown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., Case No. 4:2008cv05373 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2008) (class action lawsuit based on the use of SecuROM in 
Spore Creature Creator), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/california/candce/4:2008cv05373/209262/1/; Complaint, Cortez v. 
Electronic Arts, Inc., Case No. 3:08-cv-04917-SC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2008) 
(class action lawsuit based on Electronic Arts’ use of SecuROM in several 
different titles), available at http://media.libsyn.com/media/gamepolitics/EA-
securom-cortez-vs-ea.pdf. 
36 See, e.g., Complaint, Thomas, at ¶ 20. 
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music CDs into their computers.37  Rootkits are programs that give a user 
access to the most privileged level of a computer system, giving the person 
in control of the program virtually unlimited access to make changes to the 
computer while “effectively hiding their existence and operation from both 
a computer's user and the machine's operating system.”38  Because of this 
level of control, rootkits are often used by hackers to prevent their malicious 
actions from being detected by other applications running on the 
computer.39
¶10 A program that provides access to a user’s entire computer poses a 
significant security risk to the system.
 
40  At the same time, Sony BMG was 
also using another DRM system called MediaMax.  MediaMax was also 
installed when a user inserted the disc into her CD-ROM drive.41  Although 
the MediaMax program did not have root access, it created a similar 
vulnerability in which hackers could gain full administrator privileges over 
the computer by modifying the MediaMax folder from a less privileged 
guest account on the computer.42
¶11 When a user inserted an XCP-protected Sony BMG CD in the 
computer’s CD-ROM drive, she was greeted by an End User License 
Agreement (“EULA”) informing her that the CD would have to install a 
small program before the CD could be used to play music or copy files.
 
43  
The CD packaging itself typically contained little information other than a 
notice that the disc was “Content Protected” and a list of the system 
requirements necessary for using the disc on a computer.  Sony BMG 
provided the user with negligible advance warning that the DRM software 
was going to be installed or what the software would actually do.44  
Furthermore, MediaMax partially installed itself as soon as the user inserted 
the disc, even before she had an opportunity to read and accept the EULA.45  
These undisclosed security vulnerabilities prompted the FTC to file a 
complaint against Sony BMG for its deceptive practices in using XCP and 
MediaMax.46
                                                     
37 Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the 
Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1157, 1159 (Summer, 2007). 
38 Id. at 1159–60. 
39 Id. at 1160. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 1161. 
42 Id. at 1161–62. 
43 Id. at 1208. 
44 Id. at 1168. 
45 Id. at 1163. 
 
46 See Complaint, In re Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Docket No. C-4195, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623019/0623019cmp070629.pdf. 
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¶12 In its complaint against Sony BMG, the FTC emphasized that XCP 
and MediaMax both exposed users to significant security risks—XCP by 
enabling root access to a user’s computer and MediaMax through its ability 
to allow hackers to obtain heightened security privileges over a user’s 
system.47  The FTC further stressed the fact that it was extremely difficult to 
locate and uninstall XCP and MediaMax.48  Neither program appeared in 
the Add/Remove Programs menu on users’ computers, and both programs 
were disguised in a way that made it difficult to manually uninstall them.49  
Ultimately, the FTC and Sony BMG reached a settlement agreement in 
which the FTC issued an order requiring heightened notice requirements 
whenever the use of a CD is conditioned on the installation of particular 
kinds of DRM software.50  The FTC required Sony BMG to “clearly and 
prominently” disclose information about the exact nature of the 
technological protection measures it employs, both on the product 
packaging and in the EULA.51  These heightened notice requirements 
ensure that consumers have adequate information to decide whether they are 
willing to expose their computers to the potential security risks associated 
with Sony BMG’s technological protection measures.52
¶13 The FTC imposed several additional requirements with respect to 
the use of XCP and MediaMax.  First, the FTC stated that Sony BMG “shall 
not install or cause to be installed on a consumer’s computer any content 
protection software that prevents the consumer from readily locating or 
removing the software . . . .”
 
53  The FTC further stated that this type of 
software may not be disguised by “hiding or cloaking files, folders, or 
directories,”54 suggesting that rootkit technologies like XCP necessarily 
violate the terms of the order.55  Second, the FTC prohibited Sony BMG 
from “install[ing] or caus[ing] to be installed on a consumer’s computer any 
content protection software unless [the company] provides a reasonable and 
effective means for consumers to uninstall the software.”56
                                                     
47 Id. at ¶¶ 13–14.  
48 Id. at ¶¶ 15–16. 
49 Id. 
    Thus, even if 
Sony BMG provides clear and prominent notice about the DRM systems it 
50 See Decision and Order at 3–5, In re Sony BMG Entertainment, Docket No. 
C-4195, June 28, 2007, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623019/0623019do070629.pdf; see also 
Mulligan, supra note 37, at 1215–16. 
51 Decision and Order, In re Sony BMG, at 3–5. 
52 See Mulligan, supra note 37, at 1217. 
53 Decision and Order, In re Sony BMG, at 5. 
54 Id. 
55 Mulligan, supra note 37, at 1217. 
56 Decision and Order, In re Sony BMG, at 6. 
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employs, consumers have the right to reject the terms of Sony BMG’s 
product installation and uninstall the software at a later date. 
B. Distinguishing SecuROM from the Sony BMG Case 
¶14 Although there have been allegations that SecuROM poses similar 
security risks to the technological protection measures in the Sony BMG 
case,57 there are a few key differences that may compel the FTC to reach a 
different result should it choose to investigate Sony DADC.  As an initial 
matter, Sony DADC maintains that SecuROM operates at the normal 
application level rather than at the more privileged root level.58  This would 
mean that it is unlikely to pose the same security risk as XCP, and therefore 
would not be explicitly barred by the FTC order.  Although one of the 
plaintiffs in the pending lawsuits against Electronic Arts asserts that 
SecuROM installs itself at the root level,59
¶15 Also, unlike XCP and MediaMax, SecuROM appears to be fairly 
easy to uninstall.  Users who wish to remove SecuROM can simply visit the 
company’s website, which contains step-by-step instructions for 
downloading and running a tool that will uninstall the product from the 
user’s computer.
 no reliable news outlets have 
given any indication that SecuROM is installed anywhere other than the 
normal application level.  Further, unlike MediaMax, there have been no 
reliable reports that SecuROM enables privileged access to a user’s 
computer. 
60  Although the SecuROM removal tool leaves some 
information on users’ computers, it only leaves the files that are necessary 
to determine “whether the consumer has reached the limit of permitted 
copies of the covered product, or other comparable content protection 
data,”61 which is explicitly permitted by the FTC as long as the company 
gives proper notice and the remaining data does not adversely affect users’ 
computers.62
¶16 Furthermore, SecuROM and the companies who use it appear to be 
far more open in their publicity about the nature of the product.  For 
example, the EULA template currently employed by Electronic Arts states: 
  Therefore, the FTC is likely to view SecuROM as more 
innocuous than both of those technologies. 
Our Software uses access control and copy protection technology.  An 
internet connection is required to authenticate the Software and verify 
                                                     
57 See supra note 36 and accompanying text; infra notes 141–43 and 
accompanying text. 
58 SecuROM FAQ, supra note 9, at 2.3, 2.14–2.15. 
59 See, e.g., Complaint, Thomas, supra note 32,at ¶¶ 11–12. 
60 SecuROM FAQ, supra note 9, at 3.2. 
61 Decision and Order, In re Sony BMG, supra note 50, at 6. 
62 Compare id. with SecuROM FAQ, supra note 9 at 3.2–3.3. 
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your license.  EA reserves the right to validate your license through 
subsequent online authentication.  If your license is not valid you may 
not be able to use the Software.  The first end user of this License can 
install and authenticate the Software on a set number of machines 
which may vary by product.  The installation of EA Download 
Manager, the registration of the Software, and the acceptance of 
additional terms may be required to access online services and 
download and apply Software updates and patches.  Only licensed 
software can be used to access online services and download and apply 
updates and patches.  If the Software permits access to additional 
online features, only one copy of the Software may access those 
features at one time.  If you disable or otherwise tamper with the 
technical protection measures, the Software will not function 
properly.63
¶17 In contrast, Sony BMG’s EULA “explicitly disavowed any 
collection or dissemination of data related to customers or their 
computers”
 
64 and “[c]omponents of these [technological protection] 
measures were installed . . . before customers were confronted with the 
EULA terms.”65
¶18 Electronic Arts in particular has been very willing to disclose the 
precise nature of SecuROM,
  Thus, not only were the DRM systems potentially harmful 
to users’ computers, but consumers typically had no way of knowing 
beforehand what was going to be installed when they inserted their newly 
purchased CDs. 
66 again standing in stark contrast to Sony 
BMG’s public disavowals of the true nature of its DRM software.67
                                                     
63 Electronic Arts, End User License Agreement, 
  This 
greater level of openness with consumers represents a further departure 
from Sony BMG’s behavior, and suggests that SecuROM has substantially 
followed the guidelines in the FTC order.  Thus, unless details emerge that 
reveal that SecuROM poses a greater security risk than Sony DADC has 
claimed, the relatively innocuous nature of SecuROM and the openness 
with which Sony DADC and companies like Electronic Arts have treated it 
would probably compel the FTC to find that the current use of SecuROM 
does not run afoul of the espoused guidelines in the Sony BMG rootkit 
order. 
http://tos.ea.com/legalapp/eula/US/en/PC/ (last visited June 12, 2009). 
64 Mulligan, supra note 37, at 1167–68. 
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g., supra notes 22, 28–31 and accompanying text. 
67 As an example of Sony BMG’s public posture while the rootkit story was 
unfolding, a high-level Sony BMG employee stated at the time that “‘most 
people, I think, don't even know what a rootkit is, so why should they care about 
it?’”  Dan Mitchell, The Rootkit of All Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2005, at C5. 
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III. EVALUATING SECUROM UNDER THE DMCA’S ANTI-
CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS 
A.  The DMCA’s Anti-Circumvention Provisions 
¶19 The DMCA, enacted by Congress in 1998 as an overhaul of the 
U.S. Copyright Act, includes a section discussing circumvention of DRM 
systems, stating that “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure 
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”68  The 
DMCA also prohibits the manufacturing or distributing of products 
designed to circumvent technological access controls protecting copyrighted 
works. 69  The Act further protects against the trafficking of products that 
circumvent anti-copying controls.70
¶20 Three important court decisions interpreting these provisions of the 
DMCA are Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
 
71 Chamberlain Group, 
Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.,72 and Storage Technology Corp. v. 
Custom Hardware Engineering, Inc.73  In Corley,74 the defendant Eric 
Corley operated a website where he published links to other websites where 
users could download a program called DeCSS.75  This program enables 
users to bypass Content Scramble System (“CSS”), the DRM system used 
to prevent copying and unauthorized viewing of DVDs.76  Eight major film 
studios sued Corley, alleging that the use and dissemination of DeCSS 
violated the DMCA’s anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions by 
enabling users to circumvent CSS, a technological protection measure that 
effectively controls access to the underlying film on the DVD.77
                                                     
68 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2007); see generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
SUMMARY OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998, Dec. 1998, 
available at 
  The 
studios alleged that Corley, by providing links to websites where users 
could find DeCSS, was violating the DMCA’s anti-trafficking provision, 
http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf (discussing the 
various provisions of the DMCA and the rationale behind their inclusion in the 
statute).  This provision, and only this provision, is subject to an exemption 
process.  See infra notes 124–33 and accompanying text.  This process allows 
groups and individuals who have been, or are likely to be, adversely affected by 
this provision to seek three-year exemptions to make non-infringing uses of 
particular classes of protected works.  See id.  
69 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2007). 
70 Id. at § 1201(b)(1). 
71 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
72 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
73 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
74 273 F.3d at 429. 
75 Id. at 435–36. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 436. 
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specifically the prohibition on providing or offering of circumvention tools 
to the public.78
¶21 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided in favor of the film 
studios, affirming the decision of the district court.
 
79
Every recipient is capable not only of decrypting and perfectly copying 
plaintiffs' copyrighted DVDs, but also of retransmitting perfect copies 
of DeCSS and thus enabling every recipient to do the same. They 
likewise are capable of transmitting perfect copies of the decrypted 
DVD. The process potentially is exponential rather than linear.
  In evaluating the "dual 
use" aspect of DeCSS, the circuit court favorably quoted the district court 
judge, who stated: 
80
¶22 Thus, even if DeCSS were capable of certain lawful uses, the fact 
that it can also be used to facilitate widespread infringement caused the 
court to find that there is no reasonable way to limit the uses of DeCSS 
other than issuing injunctions against those who knowingly disseminated 
the unlawful circumvention software.
 
81  In holding for the motion picture 
studios, the court emphasized that “[p]osting DeCSS on [Corley’s] web site 
makes it instantly available at the click of a mouse to any person in the 
world with access to the Internet,”82 and that linking to other websites that 
contained DeCSS “facilitate[d] instantaneous unauthorized access to 
copyrighted materials by anyone anywhere in the world.”83
¶23 On the other side of the spectrum, Chamberlain
 
84 and Storage 
Technology85 suggest that some courts might be willing to find 
circumvention of a technological protection measure is lawful when the 
protection measure is not rationally related to protecting the exclusive rights 
afforded by copyright law.86  In Chamberlain,87
                                                     
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 459–60. 
80 Id. at 452 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 
294, 331–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
81 Id. at 457–58. 
82 Id. at 454. 
83 Id. at 457. 
84 Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
85 Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
86 See also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 
549–50 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a company that specialized in aftermarket 
printer cartridges did not violate the DMCA when it sold printer cartridges that 
circumvented the printer’s embedded software that was designed to prevent 
users from installing third party cartridges). 
87 381 F.3d at 1178. 
 the plaintiff, Chamberlain 
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Group, Inc., had developed a new garage door technology known as rolling 
code technology.88  This technology was supposedly more secure than 
previous garage door openers because the opener required the transmitter to 
submit two codes to open the door: a fixed identification code that was set 
when the user initially programmed the transmitter and a rolling code that 
automatically changed every time the user opened the garage door.89  The 
system first required users to synchronize their Chamberlain transmitters 
with their Chamberlain garage door openers, and then the software 
embedded in the Chamberlain garage door opener would only open the door 
when it received the programmed codes from the transmitter.90
¶24 Skylink Technologies, Inc., a company that specialized in 
aftermarket garage door transmitters, developed a universal remote control 
that was capable of operating the Chamberlain garage door opener without 
using the same rolling code technology.
   
91  Although Skylink did not use the 
same technology as Chamberlain’s transmitters, the Skylink transmitter 
could still be synchronized with the Chamberlain garage door opener in 
order to program the first fixed signal.92  After programming the Skylink 
transmitter, every time a user operated the transmitter it would send three 
signals: a modified fixed signal that identified the transmitter to the garage 
door opener and attempted to open the door and two additional fixed signals 
that simulated the effect of the rolling code technology by re-synchronizing 
the transmitter with the opener.93  Chamberlain sued Skylink under the 
DMCA, claiming that the universal transmitter constituted a violation of the 
DMCA’s prohibitions against circumventing access control technologies 
and distributing the tools necessary to enable such circumvention.94
¶25 In ruling for Skylink, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
did not focus on whether the rolling code technology was a technological 
protection measure that controlled access to the embedded program in 
Chamberlain’s garage door opener, or whether Skylink’s transmitter 
circumvented that technological protection measure.
 
95  Rather, in 
distinguishing this case from the district court’s decision in Corley,96
                                                     
88 Id. at 1183. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1184. 
91 Id. at 1184–85. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 1185. 
94 Id. at 1183. 
95 Id. at 1191. 
96 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 the 
court emphasized the fact that Skylink’s “accused products enable only 
2009 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 5 
legitimate uses of copyrighted software.”97  Therefore, if the court held in 
favor of Chamberlain and enjoined Skylink from distributing its universal 
transmitters, the court would have effectively allowed Chamberlain to use 
the DMCA to “[eliminate] all existing consumer expectations about the 
public's rights to use purchased products” solely because Chamberlain had 
employed a technological protection measure to control access to its garage 
door opener software.98  The DMCA created no such new property right, 
but rather gave copyright owners a method of protecting against the 
circumvention of technological protection measures that were designed to 
protect the exclusive rights afforded to copyright owners by the Copyright 
Act.99  Therefore, the court held that the DMCA “prohibits only forms of 
access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the 
Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners.”100
¶26 Finally, a Federal Circuit case after Chamberlain suggests that the 
non-infringing nature of circumvention may preclude a plaintiff from 
succeeding in a DMCA action, even if the circumventing act or tool created 
the potential for copyright infringement.  In Storage Technology,
 
101 the 
plaintiff, Storage Technology Corp. (“StorageTek”), manufactured data 
libraries, and the defendant, Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, 
Inc. (“CHE”), was a company that repaired StorageTek data libraries.102  In 
order to repair the libraries, CHE had to access the data library control 
software to ensure that it was properly configured to transmit error 
messages.103  In order to access this software, CHE needed to bypass a 
password system employed by StorageTek to restrict access to the control 
unit, and CHE used two different tools to accomplish this circumvention.104  
As StorageTek. computer code was protected by copyright,105 CHE would 
appear to have “circumvent[ed] a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a work protected under [the DMCA].”106
¶27 However, the court held for CHE on the DMCA claim for largely 
the same reasons that it held for Skylink.  Although the tools that CHE used 
to circumvent the technological protection measure gave it access to use 
StorageTek’s copyrighted computer code, these tools did not facilitate 
 
                                                     
97 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1198. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1202. 
100 Id. 
101 Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
102 Id. at 1309–10. 
103 Id. at 1310. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 1309. 
106 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2007). 
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copyright infringement because their use did not actually enable the users of 
those tools to make copies of StorageTek’s code or otherwise infringe its 
copyright.107  Thus, these tools did not “facilitate” infringement for the 
purposes of the DMCA, and therefore, “[t]here [was] simply not a sufficient 
nexus between the rights protected by copyright law and the circumvention 
of [StorageTek’s password system].”108  The court then held that in order to 
support a valid DMCA claim, the alleged violation must either “constitute 
copyright infringement or facilitate copyright infringement.”109
¶28 On its face, the statutory language of the DMCA’s anti-
circumvention provisions seems to suggest that it is unlawful to circumvent, 
or facilitate the circumvention of, any technological protection measure that 
controls access to or prevents infringement of a copyrighted work.  In 
Corley, the Second Circuit appeared to support this proposition by holding 
that DeCSS was unlawful regardless of its non-infringing, lawful uses.  The 
Chamberlain and Storage Technology court, on the other hand, tempers this 
approach by holding that circumvention of a technological protection 
measure only runs afoul of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions if 
the technological protection measure is rationally related to protecting the 
copyright owner’s intellectual property rights. 
 
B.  Is the Targeted Use Plainly Lawful? 
¶29 In evaluating SecuROM under the DMCA, it is important to note 
that as in Corley, Chamberlain, and Storage Technology, there are 
situations in which SecuROM protection might prevent a consumer from 
engaging in a plainly lawful use of her purchased software.  For example, it 
is possible that a software publisher could implement a version of 
SecuROM that does not allow users to “revoke” their activations, and any 
changes to a user’s hardware configuration will require the user to re-
activate her software.  If this user reaches her maximum number of 
installations and her operating system then crashes or she upgrades part of 
her computer, her product may cease to function until she finds some way to 
re-activate it.  Even if this user were able to obtain an additional activation 
from the publisher, the consumer might wish to avoid the inconvenience of 
calling the publisher every time she needs to re-install her product, and 
prefer instead to install her software by using an aftermarket tool that 
circumvents the activation requirement. 
¶30 Thus, using a physical copy of the software disc to reinstall 
legitimately purchased software for personal use is clearly a lawful use of 
                                                     
107 Storage Tech., 421 F.3d at 1319. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1318 (citing Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 
1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
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the product.110
¶31 This hypothetical situation is certainly plausible, especially given 
the fact that some implementations of SecuROM already do not allow users 
to revoke their activations once they have been used.
  This implementation of SecuROM, however, would prevent 
the user from engaging in this lawful act.  Therefore, like the owner of a 
Chamberlain garage door opener who merely wants to be able to open her 
garage door, a user of SecuROM-protected software could have an entirely 
legitimate, legal reason for wishing to circumvent the SecuROM activation 
limit. 
111  Although there is 
no indication that Electronic Arts will renege on its commitment to continue 
supporting access to its titles, it would not be unprecedented for a company 
that uses DRM to discontinue its support for customers who are no longer 
able to access the products that they purchased.  For example, a DMCA 
exemption proposal was recently filed with the Copyright Office that 
requests an anti-circumvention exemption for users who have purchased 
DRM-protected products from now-defunct service providers.112  This 
proposal relies heavily on examples from the music industry, in which many 
online digital music distribution services have closed their doors and left 
their customers with no way to authenticate their DRM-protected music 
files.113  Similarly, then, it is quite possible that a user will purchase a 
SecuROM-protected product with limited, server-based activations from a 
company that will eventually go out of business and leave the user with no 
method of securing an additional activation for legitimate uses of the 
software.114
¶32 Furthermore, it is plausible that a software tool could be developed 
solely to allow consumers to engage in this kind of clearly lawful use.  As 
previously discussed, SecuROM has hardware and software measures in 
place to ensure that the individual using the protected product is an 
authorized user.
 
115
                                                     
110 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2007) (permitting users to make a 
reproduction of a copyrighted program as long as the reproduction “is created as 
an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a 
machine and that it is used in no other manner”). 
111 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
112 See infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 See supra notes 16–27 and accompanying text. 
  Thus, if a tool only permitted a user to circumvent the 
activation limit, it is unclear how this kind of tool would serve any purpose 
other than enabling consumers to engage in clearly legal uses of their 
purchased products. 
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C. Circumvention of SecuROM Under the DMCA 
¶33 The facts surrounding circumvention of SecuROM's activation limit 
appear to fall somewhere between those of the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Corley and the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Chamberlain and Storage 
Technology.  Unlike the use of DeCSS in Corley, the targeted use of the 
protected product would be clearly legal because it could only be used to 
circumvent the activation requirement that is preventing the user from 
installing her software.  In contrast, as the Second Circuit stated in Corley, 
“‘the evidence as to the impact of the anti-trafficking provision[s] of the 
DMCA on prospective fair users is scanty and fails adequately to address 
the issues,’”116 suggesting that it might be plausible for users to legally 
circumvent protected products if there is adequate evidence that users’ 
lawful use rights have been adversely affected.  Also, circumventing the 
activation limit on a SecuROM-protected product would not enable the 
instant mass distribution that troubled the Corley court because the other 
technological protection measures of SecuROM would still be in place.117
¶34 Furthermore, as in Chamberlain and Storage Technology, a non-
revocable activation limit in a SecuROM-protected program could prevent 
users from engaging in plainly legal uses of their software, such as the 
ability to reinstall the program after a computer crash or minor hardware 
upgrade.  Thus, it is quite possible that this fact could compel a court to find 
that a manufacturer in such a case was attempting to use the DMCA to 
prevent access to the underlying software, rather than to protect the 
plaintiff’s intellectual property rights.  It is reasonable for a purchaser of 
computer software to assume that she will be able to do normal things with 
the software like reinstalling it.  Therefore, if the only way to reinstall a 
program is to circumvent the SecuROM activation limit, using the DMCA 
to prohibit circumvention would interfere with the consumer’s reasonable 
expectations in purchasing the software without furthering the goal of 
protecting the copyright owner’s rights under the Copyright Act.   
  
Thus, in this hypothetical scenario, there would be substantial evidence that 
the activation limit significantly restricts the ability of users to make non-
infringing uses of their software, potentially distinguishing SecuROM from 
CSS. 
¶35 On the other hand, Chamberlain applied to a technological 
protection measure used to protect embedded software from being accessed 
by competitors to create aftermarket devices.118
                                                     
116 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 338 
n.246 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
117 See supra notes 16–27 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
  Sony DADC might argue 
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that SecuROM is more similar to CSS, because companies like Electronic 
Arts implement SecuROM in order to protect their intellectual property 
rights, not merely to prevent unauthorized access to the underlying works.  
Thus, even if the targeted use is clearly legal—such as circumventing the 
activation limit in order to reinstall a legally purchased program—the 
technological protection measure may still be considered a reasonable 
attempt to protect the copyright owner’s exclusive intellectual property 
rights.  According to Corley, the most important fact was not that 
consumers could use DeCSS for non-infringing uses, but rather that 
consumers could use DeCSS to make and distribute perfect digital copies of 
the plaintiffs’ copyrighted work.119
¶36 However, if users are unable to install their legally purchased 
software without circumventing SecuROM’s activation limit, it seems to be 
a plausible reading of Storage Technology that this circumvention is lawful 
unless the “access was intertwined with a right protected by the Copyright 
Act.”
  Certainly, not every use of DeCSS 
would constitute copyright infringement, but CSS itself is a technological 
protection measure that was reasonably designed and implemented to 
protect the legal interests of copyright owners.  Likewise, SecuROM’s 
activation limit may create a burden for some individual users, but the 
interdependent package of all of SecuROM’s components may be the only 
reasonable way for copyright owners to protect their rights. 
120
¶37 If there is a situation in which users are legally able to circumvent 
one of SecuROM’s components, the DMCA’s anti-trafficking provisions 
will probably not preclude the production and distribution of certain 
software tools that are necessary for users to engage in legal circumvention.  
The best-case scenario for a developer of this kind of circumvention tool 
would involve a product that enables circumvention of the activation limit 
while leaving the other technological protection measures intact, so that its 
only function is to allow users to circumvent the activation requirement.  As 
discussed above, SecuROM is capable of using hardware protections on the 
physical installation disc in order to prevent direct copying of the 
underlying program, as well as software protections to enable online 
  Thus, even if the activation limit were an interdependent part of 
the SecuROM system of preventing copyright infringement, circumvention 
of the activation limit would probably be authorized as long as the access 
itself did not facilitate or enable infringement of the copyright owner’s 
rights. 
                                                     
119 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 452 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331–
32 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
120 Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 
1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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authentication of the software.121
D.  Analyzing Whether Users of Products Protected by Highly 
Restrictive SecuROM Implementations Should Be Exempted from the 
DMCA  
1. The Evidentiary Burden in the Rulemaking Procedure 
  Chamberlain and Storage Technology 
suggest that some courts might not have so readily affirmed an injunction 
against linking to DeCSS if the technological protection measure in 
question had placed a demonstrably significant burden on lawful users 
without furthering the goal of protecting the plaintiff’s intellectual property 
rights.  Thus, if a product could be developed that only circumvented the 
activation limit, and if it could be demonstrated that the activation limit has 
created a significant burden on lawful uses of the protected software, then 
such a tool might avoid the Corley problem of needing to prohibit dual-use 
technologies. Such a program might, then, be considered lawful under the 
anti-trafficking provisions. 
¶38 Since the enactment of the DMCA in 1998, every three years the 
Register of Copyrights evaluates applications for exemptions to the 
DMCA’s prohibition against user circumvention of access controls.122  The 
Register then makes recommendations to the Librarian of Congress on 
whether to grant or deny the requested exemptions.123  In order to qualify 
for an exemption, the DMCA requires evidence that “persons who are users 
of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year 
period, adversely affected by the [anti-circumvention prohibition] in their 
ability to make noninfringing uses . . . of a particular class of copyrighted 
works.”124  The Register of Copyrights approves very few of these 
applications, suggesting that the evidentiary burden is extremely high.125
¶39 In order to obtain an exemption, the entity proposing the exemption 
has the burden of demonstrating that some kind of actual adverse impact on 
the ability of users to engage in lawful, non-infringing activities has resulted 
from the lack of an exemption or that “adverse effects are more likely than 
 
                                                     
121 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
122 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2007).  This exemption process only applies 
to the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA, not to either of the anti-
trafficking provisions.  Id.; see also supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
123 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2007). 
124 Id. 
125 See generally Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, 2006 
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, Nov. 17, 2006, available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/1201_recommendation.pdf 
(recommending only six exemptions out of seventy-four submitted requests). 
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not to occur.”126  The most compelling evidence of actual harm comes from 
first-hand accounts of instances in which users were harmed by the lack of 
an exemption, and theoretical critiques alone are insufficient to meet the 
evidentiary burden placed on the proponent of the exemption.127
¶40 For example, anti-censorship activist Seth Finkelstein submitted a 
successful request in 2002 for an exemption to allow circumvention of 
Internet filtering software applications in order to access the lists of blocked 
sites used by these applications.
 
128  In this request, Finkelstein relied heavily 
on his own first-hand experiences with how the anti-circumvention 
provisions would prevent him, and in some cases had prevented him, from 
being able to engage in non-infringing activities.129  He had previously 
decrypted several of these “censorware” applications for the purposes of 
news reporting, education, and criticism of the software companies who 
developed these programs.130  He detailed both why these specific actions 
constituted non-infringing uses, and how the DMCA prevented him from 
engaging in these lawful uses prior to obtaining an exemption during the 
1999 rulemaking session.131  Thus, he met the burden of proof by showing 
actual, demonstrable evidence of harm rather than merely speculative or 
theoretical critiques of the DMCA and its potential effects.132
2. Evaluating the Plausibility of an Exemption for SecuROM 
 
¶41 It would be very difficult for an entity seeking an exemption for 
circumventing SecuROM’s activation limit to meet this high evidence 
threshold.  Thus, the Register of Copyrights would almost certainly not 
recommend such an exemption.  The first major hurdle is the requirement 
that users of SecuROM-protected products be adversely affected or likely to 
be adversely affected within the next three years.133
                                                     
126 Notice of Inquiry, 73 Fed. Reg. 58073 (Oct. 6, 2008), available at 
  Current 
implementations of SecuROM are generally not restrictive enough to create 
a likelihood that users will be adversely affected within three years.  The 
most restrictive example of a SecuROM-branded product comes from Mass 
http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2008/73fr58073.pdf. 
127 Id. 
128 SETH FINKELSTEIN, PLEA FOR A DMCA EXEMPTION DURING 2002 
RULEMAKING SESSION, at 2–3, available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/comments/031.pdf (last visited June 12, 
2009). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 See SETH FINKELSTEIN, HOW TO WIN (DMCA) EXEMPTIONS AND INFLUENCE 
POLICY, http://sethf.com/publications/dmca-guide.php (last visited June 12, 
2009). 
133 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2007). 
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Effect.134  Mass Effect's DRM  only allows three activations instead of five, 
and unlike some other Electronic Arts SecuROM-protected products, the 
user does not receive activation revocations when the game is uninstalled.135  
It is certainly plausible that users will use these three activations rather 
quickly—for example, by using one installation on a desktop computer, one 
on a laptop computer, and one reinstallation after an operating system crash.  
At that point, users would not be able to sell the game, nor would they be 
able to reinstall it in the event of another computer crash, without contacting 
Electronic Arts to request an additional activation.136  The company, 
however, has repeatedly stressed that it will continue to support its products, 
and there is no evidence that it will withhold additional activations from 
users who legitimately need them.137
¶42 Although more highly restrictive implementations of SecuROM 
might qualify for an exemption once there is evidence that the product has 
restricted users from engaging in clearly non-infringing uses, there is no 
evidence that software using a more restrictive version of SecuROM will be 
released within the next three years.  Attempts to implement more 
restrictive versions of SecuROM’s software have been met with significant 
consumer backlash,
  Thus, because this burden on users is 
relatively insignificant, it is highly unlikely that Mass Effect will provide 
sufficient evidence to warrant a DMCA exemption for this type of 
circumvention during the next rulemaking period. 
138 and therefore no company has yet released software 
protected by a version of SecuROM that is much more restrictive than that 
of Mass Effect.  Even Mass Effect and Spore were originally designed to 
require users to re-authenticate the software online every ten days,139 a 
feature that was removed from the SecuROM implementations before the 
final products were released.140
                                                     
134 BioWare's Mass Effect for PC Now Available in North America, BUSINESS 
WIRE, May 28, 2008, available at 
  Thus, not only have the most restrictive 
versions of SecuROM not yet been released, but the negative public 
response against companies that have tried to use more restrictive 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2008_May_28/ai_n25457226.  
135 BioWare/Electronic Arts Response, supra note 22. 
136 Id. 
137 See id.; Spore DRM FAQ, http://help.spore.com/cgi-
bin/easpore.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_sid=i2IjIJlj&p_accessibility=0&p_r
edirect=&p_faqid=19743 (last visited June 12, 2009) [hereinafter Spore DRM 
FAQ]. 
138 See Electronic Arts Response, supra note 28. 
139 Matt Peckham, Mass Effect and Spore to Require Online Authentication 
Every 10 Days, PCWORLD, May 7, 2008, 
http://blogs.pcworld.com/gameon/archives/006904.html. 
140 See BioWare/Electronic Arts Response, supra note 22; Spore DRM FAQ, 
supra note 138. 
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configurations suggests that companies may be unlikely to employ such 
tactics any time in the near future. 
3. Pending Exemptions That May Affect SecuROM 
¶43 Finally, it is important to note that on December 3, 2008, two 
proposed exemptions were submitted to the Copyright Office that may 
affect the rights of certain users to circumvent SecuROM and other 
software-based DRM systems.  First, J. Alex Halderman, a professor at the 
University of Michigan whose rootkit circumvention exemption request was 
granted during the 2006 rulemaking proceedings,141 has requested an 
exemption for circumvention of similar technological protection measures 
that may pose significant security risks to users.142  The proposed 
exemption focuses on SecuROM in particular, arguing that (1) security 
researchers should be allowed to circumvent software like SecuROM to 
determine whether it poses security risks, and (2) if security researchers are 
not allowed to circumvent SecuROM for research, individual users should 
be allowed to circumvent SecuROM and similar DRM systems in order to 
install legitimately purchased software without exposing themselves to 
potential security risks.143
¶44 Second, Christopher Soghoain, a student fellow at Harvard 
University, submitted a request for an exemption that would allow users to 
circumvent server-based DRM access controls.
 
144  Although the exemption 
request focuses heavily on several music services that have recently gone 
out of business, it also discusses the potential problems associated with the 
online authentication requirements of SecuROM-protected products.145  If a 
company implements a version of SecuROM that requires periodic online 
authentication, as was originally planned with Spore and Mass Effect,146 and 
that company then goes out of business, users could be left without a 
method of legally authenticating their purchased software.147
                                                     
141 Christopher Soghoain, DMCA Exemptions Desired to Hack iPhones, DVDs, 
CNET NEWS, Dec. 2, 2008, 
 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-10112046-
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142 J. ALEX HALDERMAN, EXEMPTION TO PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION OF 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR ACCESS CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES, Dec. 
2, 2008, available at 
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143 Id. at 13, 15–16. 
144 CHRISTOPHER SOGHOAIN, EXEMPTIONS TO PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION 
OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR DEFUNCT DRM AND COPY 
PROTECTION-BASED STORES, Dec. 2, 2008, available at 
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145 Id. at 9. 
146 See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
¶45 In all of these possible legal challenges to SecuROM, the result will 
ultimately depend on the evidence.  If the plaintiffs in the currently pending 
cases against Electronic Arts are able to prove that SecuROM actually 
installs itself at the root level, or otherwise exposes its users to risks similar 
to those posed by XCP and MediaMax in the Sony BMG case, Sony DADC 
might see a similar FTC order regarding SecuROM.  If, on the other hand, 
Sony DADC has been accurate and honest in its description of its software 
and the way that it functions, it would be difficult for a plaintiff to bring a 
successful challenge against any existing implementations of SecuROM.  It 
would be similarly difficult to obtain a DMCA exemption for 
circumvention of features like the activation limit. 
¶46 However, even if a company does not use the most restrictive 
version of SecuROM, it is still possible that a tool could be developed that 
only allows users to circumvent the activation limit without violating the 
DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions.  Like the aftermarket garage door 
opener in Chamberlain, this kind of tool might be developed and distributed 
freely as long as it only enables consumers to engage in lawful uses of their 
products.  Thus, in a future case involving this hypothetical circumvention 
tool, the legal analysis must begin by determining whether the technological 
protection measure at issue bears a rational relationship to preventing 
infringing uses of the product, not merely whether a technological 
protection measure has been circumvented.  If the court in this hypothetical 
situation follows the pro-consumer lead of Chamberlain and Storage 
Technology, then the court’s decision could serve as an important, much-
needed tempering of the DMCA’s blanket prohibition against the 
development and distribution of circumvention tools. 
¶47 A tempering of the DMCA is especially important given the high 
evidentiary burden of the DMCA exemption process and the fact that the 
exemption process only applies to one of the DMCA’s three anti-
circumvention provisions.  Although the process should function as a 
safeguard against overly burdensome technological protection measures, the 
stringent evidence requirements and emphasis on imminent harm essentially 
guarantee that there will not be an exemption for circumventing systems 
like SecuROM until users are actually being locked out of using their 
software.  Moreover, even if an exemption were granted to allow users to 
circumvent SecuROM, the anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA would 
still be in full effect.  Thus, it would be illegal for software developers to 
create and distribute the tools that are necessary to enable such 
circumvention.  Users, then, would have the legal right to circumvent access 
controls with no legal way of obtaining the tools to do so.  This would be 
like the Chamberlain court allowing consumers to circumvent the access 
controls on their garage door openers while prohibiting Skylink from 
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producing and distributing universal remotes.  In the future, courts need to 
look to decisions like Chamberlain to ensure that consumers have access to 
the tools that they need to engage in lawful circumvention. 
